אם צריך להציג או לשמור? למידה של חשיפה מבוקרת

תקציר מקורי באנגליתarXiv:2609.39818v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: In many high-stakes settings, human decision-makers can acquire support information before making a decision. However, acquiring information is costly, and disclosure may fail to improve human decisions or may even impair them. We tackle this problem by studying selective disclosure, i.e., the problem of learning when to reveal support information to a human decision-maker under a budget constraint. We first show that the optimal policy is a threshold rule on the Value of Information (VoI), i.e., the expected reduction in human decision risk induced by disclosure. Since VoI is unknown in practice, we estimate the regime-specific human risks and bound the possible degradation of the resulting plug-in policy relative to lack of disclosure, as w