הבדלה בתפקידים כמנוע למנוע מידע קולקטיבי

תקציר מקורי באנגליתarXiv:2609.05442v2 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Informational active matter shows how measurement-informed decisions produce collective order, so far in systems that reach consensus. We design collective information engines structured by differentiation instead, and construct a minimal instance using anti-coordination games where differentiated role information has value. Within many coexisting games, agents infer their role from a noisy social signal grounded in a persistent identity, and role-following action feeds back into that signal, which shapes the incentive to follow roles. Resources accrued through coordinated role-play combine with identity variability to reinforce the schemas that generated them. The model thereby operationalizes Sewell's duality of schemas and resources in S