מרחב הסיבוב למניפולד הסיבוב: גבולות והשגיה של התקפי נתונים כוזבים

תקציר מקורי באנגליתarXiv:2609.10631v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: A false data injection attack (FDIA) can change the estimated grid state while evading a residual-based bad data detector (BDD). Existing blind attacks learn a low-rank measurement subspace, but this algebraic view does not state the physical grid constraints that make an attack stealthy or the minimum information needed to recover the complete attack space. Under the connected direct-current (DC) branch-flow model, we show that the residual-sensitive subspace of the noiseless orthogonal test is exactly the weighted cycle space. Its orthogonal complement is therefore the complete stealthy attack space, making weighted cycle-space knowledge both necessary and sufficient for complete blind FDIA. This space identifies the topology only up to 2