החברה הזאבים: הבנת סיכון קולקטיבי מפגעי-אג'נט גדלים בחברות סוצייטי-פיננסיות

תקציר מקורי באנגליתarXiv:2609.05591v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Safety evaluations typically focus on individual agents, but interacting agents can spread harmful information and influence the environment in which later decisions are made. We study how collective failure changes with harmful-agent fraction and society size in a controlled financial agent society, where agents communicate over a social network and trade in a shared market. In the primary financial scenario, collective failure requires broad harmful diffusion together with severe price dislocation or liquidity stress. Across all tested society sizes, failure remains rare at low harmful fractions but rises sharply over a narrow range. As society size grows from N=100 to N=2000, the harmful fraction associated with a 50% failure probability