CABAL: פלטפורמה לבדיקת תוצאות של קולוסיות בבקשת חוות דין

תקציר מקורי באנגליתarXiv:2609.05227v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Recent reports during the AAAI-27 review cycle highlight the risk of reviewers coordinating bids for reciprocal assignment advantage. Prior work treats bidding, reviewer assignment, and review manipulation as separate stages, leaving the lifecycle effects of collusive bidding unclear. Real-world analysis is further constrained by typically unobservable collusive intent and the lack of counterfactuals for the same conference. Motivated by this gap, we introduce \alg, an end-to-end multi-agent simulacra framework for studying reviewer assignment integrity by holding the conference environment fixed and configuring LLM-driven reviewer agents with honest or collusive policies. We further develop an affinity-guided collusive bidding strategy that