Content Creation with Spillovers: An Incentive Design Approach

תקציר מקורי באנגליתarXiv:2603.14372v3 Announce Type: replace Abstract: The rise of AI amplifies the economic phenomenon of \emph{positive spillovers}: when creators contribute content that can be reused and adapted by LLMs, one creator's effort may improve the content quality of others through recombination. While such spillovers can improve content quality, they also reshape incentives, as creators may reduce effort when they can benefit from others' contributions. We introduce the \emph{Content Creation with Spillovers} (CCS) model, a game between a platform and strategic creators. In this game, each creator chooses an effort level, and qualities are jointly determined by all creators' efforts. The platform contracts on qualities while seeking to maximize social welfare. We show that standard contest mecha