Equilibrium Causal Games: Separation, Identification, and the Identifiability of Cyclic Latent States

תקציר מקורי באנגליתarXiv:2607.19531v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Power grids, markets, and interacting populations, settle into feedback driven equilibria observed through unknown sensors. Our Equilibrium Causal Game (ECG) joins a game to its cyclic causal model, hidden inputs, sensor map, and rules for interventions and equilibrium selection; interventions edit declared objects and recompute equilibrium. Under stated conditions, ECG-separation is sound but incomplete in our examples. Back-door/half-trek routes identify observed queries. Yet for an untouched rotationally symmetric Gaussian block, second moments determine only a source-frame rotation, across which distinct-variable effects generically change. Unknown sensing creates a separate ambiguity. In passive stable linear models without self-effect