העדפות חברתיות המתייחסות לעצמן: שיתוף פעולה ללא צפייה בתגמולים של אחרים

תקציר מקורי באנגליתarXiv:2610.07881v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Social preferences can promote cooperation in multi-agent reinforcement learning, but existing approaches often require agents to observe the rewards of their peers. In many real-world interactions, however, an agent can, as humans do, observe others' behavior and outcomes without access to their private reward signals. We introduce self-referenced social preferences, in which each agent learns a model of its own reward, applies it to other agents' observed transitions to assess their outcomes from its own perspective, and feeds these self-referenced assessments into standard social preferences. We study two ways to incorporate these assessments: modifying the learning reward, or using them to weight policy updates. We evaluate the approa