למידה תקינה של משחקים סטוכסטיים רב-מסלוליים

תקציר מקורי באנגליתarXiv:2609.04189v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: We introduce the first Probably Approximately Correct (PAC) learning framework for general-sum concurrent stochastic games (CSGs) with transition uncertainty, while addressing the challenge of Nash equilibrium (NE) existence. Our algorithm maintains data-driven $L^1$ confidence sets over transition kernels and solves a robust CSG to compute a social-welfare optimal $\varepsilon$-NE, using a robust MDP-based exploration mechanism to drive joint state-action coverage. Crucially, we introduce a Nash margin characterisation that enables principled reasoning about equilibrium existence: the framework either returns an $\varepsilon$-approximate NE whose social-welfare value is $\varepsilon$-close to optimal, or provides a sound certificate that