מדד קטן של ניטור אינדיקציה לא תקין של שליטה

תקציר מקורי באנגליתarXiv:2610.03458v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Post-training with verifiable rewards can induce reward hacking, motivating the use of monitors within the training objective rather than solely for offline auditing. We show that a low monitor readout does not identify whether such an intervention controls behavior. In a code-generation environment whose dominant exploit is available at the start of the reasoning trace, we train policies against three monitors that pass the same offline gate: an in-domain activation probe and two penalties conditioned on how early the policy commits to its own final answer. The probe score is at its numerical floor from the first recorded training step, and the trained-score median is zero for every prefix-trained run at the endpoint. These readouts estima