Normal-Form Correlation in Markov Games

תקציר מקורי באנגליתarXiv:2610.03621v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: There has been a surge of recent work on correlated equilibrium concepts in Markov games. However, existing results focus on concepts weaker than normal-form correlated equilibria (NFCEs), leaving open the more challenging question of computing such equilibria, which goes back to the seminal work of Papadimitriou and Roughgarden (JACM'08). Here, we establish the first efficient algorithm for NFCEs in finite-horizon Markov games with a fixed number of players $n$. In particular, with $S$ states, horizon $H$, and at most $A$ actions per player, it computes an $\epsilon$-NFCE in time $S(AH/\epsilon)^{O(n)}$. This is the first algorithm polynomial in $1/\epsilon$ and the description of the game for NFCEs in an interesting class of problems beyo