EquiMem: Calibrating Shared Memory in Multi-Agent Debate via Game-Theoretic Equilibrium

תקציר מקורי באנגליתarXiv:2605.09278v2 Announce Type: replace Abstract: Multi-agent debate (MAD) systems increasingly rely on shared memory to support long-horizon reasoning, but this convenience opens a critical vulnerability: a single corrupted entry can contaminate the downstream memory-augmented reasoning, and debate alone fails to filter such errors. Existing safeguards filter entries via heuristics or LLM-based validation, yet they rely on AI judgments that share the same failure modes and overlook the cross-agent dynamics of MAD. We address this gap by formulating memory updating in MAD as a zero-trust memory game, in which no agent is assumed reliable and the game's equilibrium motivates a principled objective for calibrating memory influence. Guided by this objective, we propose EquiMem, an inference