Towards a Resilience-Theoretic Foundation for Adversarial Robustness in Industrial Control System Anomaly Detection

תקציר מקורי באנגליתarXiv:2609.07244v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Anomaly-based intrusion detection systems in industrial control systems (ICS) and operational technology (OT) environments are increasingly required to meet formal resilience criteria: absorbed adversarial disturbances, graceful degradation under sustained attack, and certified system-level guarantees. Existing resilience frameworks for cyber-physical systems define absorb-recover-adapt trajectories at the architectural level but do not treat machine learning anomaly detectors as first-class components, leaving a gap between component-level robustness evaluation and system-level resilience certification. In this paper, we establish that adversarial robustness in ICS anomaly detection is a specific instantiation of system resilience, and for